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Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza S.p.A. – 31 January 
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Record of the action 
n. 36 of 31 January 2013 
THE GUARANTOR FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
PERSONAL DATA 
Having convened today, in the presence of Dr 
Antonello Soro, the President, Dr Augusta Iannini, vice 
president, Dr Giovanna Bianchi Clerici and Professor 
Licia Califano, components, and Dr Giuseppe Busia, 
general secretary; 
HAVING REGARD TO Legislative Decree of 30 June 
2003, n. 196, amending the Code regarding the 
protection of personal data (the ‘Code’); 
CONSIDERING the request of the preliminary 
verification submitted by IT Telecom s.r.l. and Cassa di 
Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza S.p.A. (In his capacity 
of leader of Cariparma Crédit Agricole) pursuant to 
art. 17 of the Code; 
HAVING EXAMINED the records on file; 
HAVING REGARD TO the observations made by the 
Secretary General pursuant to art. 15 of the 
Regulation of the Guarantor n. 1/2000; 
REPORTER Dr Antonello Soro; 
FOREWARD 
1. The request made by the companies. 
1.1. IT Telecom s.r.l. and Cassa di Risparmio di Parma 
e Piacenza S.p.A., in a joint memorandum of 27 April 
2012 regularized subsequently, also in the interest of 
Banca Popolare Friuladria S.p.A. and Cassa di 
Risparmio della Spezia S.p.A., in a communication of 
29 November 2012 – have expressed their intention 
to, respectively, provide, and use a service of remote 
digital signature with biometric authentication ‘based 
on the use of devices that detect the dynamic features 
distinctive of a handwritten signature’ applied by the 
users when digitally signing contracts or bank forms; 
that, in order to ensure to them, through systems of 
‘strong authentication’, ‘the use of their private keys 
[necessary] to make digital signature operations’ over 
the counter. It would, in essence, be a system based 
on secure devices for signature, kept by IT Telecom 
s.r.l. (in its grade as a certification service provider 
accredited at the Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale, 
previously DigitPA), able to recognize the 
‘behavioural’ characteristic of the user through the 
analysis of a number of parameters that can be 
derived from the signature (speed of gesture, 
pressure, acceleration, inclination, etc.), affixed by the 
latter on a specific ‘tablet’ present at the counter in 
view of its authentication and the simultaneous 
initiation of procedures for the signing of documents 
with a digital signature. Since the service, provided in 
practice by IT Telecom s.r.l., by interfacing with the 
computer facilities available at individual banks, 
would lead to a processing of personal data with 
potentially source of a number of specific risks for the 
subjects at issue, which is why the companies felt they 
had to submit to the Authority a request for 
preliminary verification pursuant to art. 17 of the 
Code. 
In support of the application, IT Telecom s.r.l. and 
Cariparma S.p.A. have produced two separate 
documents relating to the mode of operation of the 
system and the characteristics of the process they, 
within their respective jurisdiction (see below), are 
planning to develop. 
2. Document of IT Telecom s.r.l. 
 
DATA PROTECTION PRELIMINARY VERIFICATION TRANSLATION: ITALY                                        vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014) | 214 
 
2.1. According to the documentation sent out by IT 
Telecom s.r.l., the general pattern envisaged for the 
performance of the service consists of two phases. 
In the first phase (‘provisioning’), the user who 
intends to join the service, after identification at the 
counter and ‘registration’ of his personal data in the 
information systems of the individual bank, ‘will be 
associated with a set of information characteristics of 
his handwritten signature (called a specimen) 
detected by requiring the [subject] to affix on the 
tablet his/her [subscription] for at least three times.’ 
The specimen obtained, consisting of synthetic digital 
representations (templates) generated during the 
collection of signatures (containing information 
related to the image of the signature, the identifier of 
the tablet and the ‘biometric’ characteristic of the 
signature), will be stored in a specific database kept at 
IT Telecom s.r.l., for the purposes of subsequent 
comparison during authentication. 
As part of this preliminary procedure, the specimen, 
together with the identification data of the person 
concerned, will be forwarded by the bank, in 
encrypted form through expressly secure channels, to 
IT Telecom s.r.l. for the verification and validation of 
the application and to issue the digital certificate 
associated with the applicant. 
The signatory, having previously being informed by 
the bank regarding the processing of personal and 
biometrics data consequently to his/her request to 
activate the service – for which the agreement of the 
customer is also acquired – will then confirm the 
request by signing the form provided by IT Telecom 
s.r.l. (which also contains the terms and conditions of 
service). 
2.2. In the next phase of authentication, the user is 
invited, every time, to affix his signature on the tablet 
with the purpose, amongst other things, to activate 
the signing process aimed at applying a digital 
signature to the document; the information acquired, 
immediately converted into a template, are 
transmitted in encrypted form, together with a 
‘footprint’ of the document to be digitally signed 
(digest, obtained with a hash algorithm) and the 
numeric identification code of the signatory, to a 
specific server hosted by IT Telecom s.r.l. The 
template calculated on the spot is compared with the 
one generated at the time of ‘registration’ to verify if 
it matches and ascertains that the serial number of 
the tablet is actually among those recorded.1 Also, for 
security purposes, the ‘hash’ of the template is 
calculated too, so that you can verify any 
correspondence with the ‘hash’ of one the templates 
already verified in previous signature operations 
carried out by the same signatory; this measure has 
the purpose of preventing the possible fraudulent use 
of the service.2 The authentication operation will end 
positively only if all three tests are completed 
successfully (in particular, in order to unlock the 
functions of digital signature, the first two tests 
should succeed, while the third must fail). 
2.3. The entire authentication process, according to 
the company, must be regarded as distinct from the 
one related to affixing a digital signature. The 
biometric data of the users, in fact, will be treated, for 
the purposes of authentication, exclusively through 
the server dedicated to it, independent and separate 
from those used for issuing digital certificates and for 
affixing the digital signature; furthermore, the 
identification data of the users would be stored at a 
server different from the one provided for storing (in 
encrypted form) specimens, in order to prevent their 
direct and immediate associability. The same server, 
finally, would be located in areas protected and 
accessible only to the persons so entitled (in charge of 
processing and personnel specifically authorized by IT 
Telecom s.r.l.), while operations on the data and the 
systems would be adequately tracked through a 
special ‘access & audit logging’ system. 
This brings the company – as an accredited 
Certification Authority, under the strict supervision of 
the Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale, also regarding aspects 
related to the management of data security and 
systems – to affirm that the information stored for 
biometric signature verification would not be, in the 
light of organisational and management measures 
adopted, ‘usable directly [...] in other contexts with 
effects on the parties concerned.’ 
In addition, the biometric data related to users, in the 
event of cessation of use, would be erased or made 
irreversibly anonymous ‘immediately or as soon as 
                                                          
1 This text is not actually in the original document, but is added to 
provide a better explanation. 
2 This template is calculated on the spot, at the authentication 
signature application. In other words, when one signer applies his 
signature on the tablet, this signature template is calculated. Since 
no two identical handwritten signatures exist, similarly there must be 
no identical ‘on the spot’ templates. If this event occurs, it means 
that some rogue managed to capture one template and is trying to 
masquerade as the authentic signatory. 
 
DATA PROTECTION PRELIMINARY VERIFICATION TRANSLATION: ITALY                                        vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014) | 215 
 
technically possible and in any case no later than 30 
calendar days from the recording of the event.’ 
2.4. The system, as a whole, will not only significantly 
reduce the risk of any attempts of identity theft,3 but 
would, in the future, guarantee the ‘dematerialisation 
of processes managed with paperwork’ for the 
transactions to be carried out directly at the bank 
branch. In addition, the service meets the need to 
ensure to the parties concerned – in compliance with 
the constraints imposed by the legislation on digital 
signatures – the ‘exclusive control of their private 
signature keys for the legal validity of signed 
documents and their verification’. 
3. The document of Cariparma S.p.A. 
Taking advantage of the system under consideration, 
Cariparma S.p.A., as well as Friuladria S.p.A. and 
Carispezia S.p.A., believe they can make significant 
improvements to its organisational and management 
processes, especially in terms of ‘efficiency’ 
(simplification and streamlining of operations at the 
counter; improvement of the quality of the services 
provided), ‘security’ (reliable identification of users, 
fraud prevention and detection) and ‘economy of 
resources’ (dematerialisation of forms, reducing the 
costs of storage of documents; respect for the 
environment); all this, without significantly altering 
the habits of users and at the same time relieving 
them of the burden of using additional tools (smart 
cards, tokens, etc.) for the use of the relevant ‘private 
key’, by subsidizing, this way, the subscription of 
digitally signed documents. 
As part of this overall service, the processing of 
biometric data would respond primarily to the need to 
adequately verify the identity of users who have 
provided their consent for this purpose; this, not only 
because of the increasing number of fraud cases 
reported, but also in terms of compliance with the 
specific obligations imposed on individual banks under 
the legislation on money laundering. 
However, should these users not be able to or not 
intend to adopt the biometric authentication service, 
an ‘alternative’ mode has been identified that involves 
the use of the cellular telephone as a device for the 
identification of the person concerned, in particular 
by sending IT Telecom s.r.l. the specific signature PIN 
issued to it by the same certification authority in the 
light of activating the procedure of signing the 
                                                          
3 That is, misappropriation of identity. 
document with a digital signature. Nevertheless, this 
last mode should be considered, according to the 
bank, as ‘exceptional’, because it is aimed at a 
‘management of activities at the counter different 
from that linked to the use of the [remote digital 
signature]’, which would fail to meet fully the 
purposes outlined above. 
The activation of the service, in any case, would take 
place only after the release to interested parties of 
the relevant information and the acquisition of their 
consent to the processing of their biometric data by 
the respective controllers. Finally, in order to ensure 
high security standards with regard to users’ data, the 
banks have said that operators for the identification 
and supervision of the operations of biometric 
authentication – identified as an ‘appointee’ pursuant 
to art. 30 of the Code – will treat the concerned 
personal data only after passing a specific 
authentication procedure. 
4. Subsequent communications from the company. 
With the subsequent communications of 20 and 27 
November and 21 December 2012, the applicant 
companies have provided some information in order 
to process biometric data in the application for 
preliminary verification, providing, also, to better 
illustrate the architecture chosen for the contractual 
provision and the use of the service in view of a more 
precise detection, with respect to the processing of 
biometric data of the interested parties, the actual 
decision-making powers in the hands of each of the 
parties involved. 
As refers the first profile, while reaffirming the 
distinction between the process of strong 
authentication and the signing of documents with a 
digital signature (a circumstance, which was 
confirmed by all parties), IT Telecom s.r.l. then stated, 
for its part, that the service takes into account the 
‘modifiability in the time of the handwritten 
signature’ (through the functions of ‘self-learning’ that 
would allow a constant ‘update of the specimen [on 
the] basis [of] rules [operating on] temporal elements, 
numerical and statistical data’), while the banks have 
confirmed, as pertaining to them, they want to make 
use of the same service, amongst other things, for the 
purpose of a ‘customer due diligence required by law 
anti-money laundering.’ Moreover, with specific 
reference to the degree of reliability of the system – 
already pre-set in order to guarantee a reduced 
number of possible ‘false positives’ and ‘false 
negatives’: called the ‘degree of tolerance of the 
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system’ – it was made clear that this risk should be 
considered further reduced in view of the 
organisational mode chosen for the same service, 
which provide for the recognition of the customer by 
the bank officer in charge of visual identification at 
the individual bank. 
In the context, furthermore, of the complex scheme 
envisaged by the parties for the provision and use of 
the service – which provides for the conclusion of a 
contract between banks and Telecom Italia S.p.A. (in 
its capacity as provider of ‘certification authority 
services’ subcontracted to IT Telecom s.r.l.) and a 
separate contract between the same certification 
authority and signatory (‘users’ of the service), and 
the same banks (‘end users’) –, the companies 
believe, within their respective competences, to be 
autonomous controllers of the treatment of the data. 
In particular, IT Telecom s.r.l. understands that it is 
the controller of the treatment of personal and 
biometric data of the signatories for the purpose of 
activation, delivery, management, administration and 
maintenance of the service through their information 
systems, while Cariparma S.p.A. and other banks 
would be independent controllers of their respective 
treatments ‘for the purposes of only operations of 
identification, activation and subsequent use of the 
service’, limited to the portion of interfacing with their 
own information platforms. This is due in particular to 
the fact that the companies would operate 
‘independently in their respective areas of 
competence’ (to be considered ‘clearly distinct from 
the operational and organizational viewpoint’) and 
that the banks, however, have a limited decision-
making power in relation to how to perform the entire 
service to be rendered, through IT Telecom s.r.l., in 
strict accordance with local regulations concerning 
digital signatures. 
By contrast, no processing of biometric data would be 
carried out by Telecom Italia S.p.A. with reference to 
the data of the signatories, the latter acting as a mere 
distributor of services provided by IT Telecom s.r.l. 
In order to support the systems and procedures 
referred to, the companies have produced 
documentation related, among other things, to the 
draft agreement between Telecom Italia S.p.A. and 
purchasing banks, as well as a copy of the General 
Terms and Conditions relating to the service itself. 
5. Authority Assessments. 
5.1. The preliminary application submitted to the 
Authority relates to the processing of biometric data 
for authentication purposes related to the use of a 
system suitable to analyse and compare a number of 
parameters derived from affixing on a specific device, 
by interested parties, their handwritten signature on 
the occasion of the procedures of digitally signing 
documents. This measure, which takes into account 
the content of the instance formulated and the 
statements made by the parties (pursuant to art. 168 
of the Code) in order to assess the difference between 
the digital signature procedure and the authentication 
one, focuses only on profiles related to the processing 
of biometric personal data connected to the latter. 
It should first be noted in this regard that the Working 
Party on the protection of personal data under art. 29 
of Directive 95/46/EC considers that systems based on 
the use of devices that can detect the ‘dynamic’ 
features of a signature come within the meaning of 
the treatment of behavioural biometrics data, and as 
such fall within the scope of the regulations for the 
protection of personal data (see Working Document 
on Biometrics of 1 August 2003, WP 80, cf. further 
Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric 
technologies of 27 April 2012, WP 193). That said, it is 
important, in this perspective, if the system under the 
scrutiny of the Authority can be deemed as compliant, 
limited to profiles regarding the processing of 
biometric data of users in the authentication phase, 
with the discipline of the Code, with particular 
reference to both the correct identification of the role 
played by each of the companies involved in the 
procedure of authentication, and the observance of 
the principles of necessity, legality, purpose and 
proportionality (article 3:11, paragraph 1, lett.), b) and 
d) , of Legislative Decree n. 196/2003); this, even in 
the case in which the biometric data is collected by 
the banks, as in the present case, only for purposes of 
completion of the enrolment phase and is 
subsequently used (in the form of numerical code), by 
the certification authority, for the operations in 
comparison authentication procedures (in argument, 
see Provv. 23 January 2008, doc. web n. 1487903; 
Provv. 26 May 2011, doc. web n. 1832558; Provv. 4 
October 2012, doc. web n. 2059743). 
5.2. Compared to the first profile, it is, first of all, to 
emphasize that the complex architecture of the 
contract chosen by the parties for the provision and 
regulation of the entire service (including, as 
mentioned, the biometric data processing for 
authentication purposes) does not help, by itself, to 
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the framing of the case in terms of the identification 
of responsibility with regard to the processing of 
biometric data of users. Nevertheless, it seems to this 
Authority, that the statements made and documents 
submitted, as a matter of fact not always uniquely 
matching, have highlighted elements such as to make 
believe in any case that the present case, contrary to 
the claims of the applicant companies, is more 
properly due under of a co-ownership of the same 
(and only) treatment (article 4, paragraph 1, lett. f) of 
the Code); this, both because of what follows with 
reference to each of the parties involved, and in the 
light of the views expressed by the aforementioned 
group for the protection of personal data, according 
to which ‘it is in the presence of a situation of shared 
responsibility when various parties determine, for 
specific treatments, or the purpose or the 
fundamental aspects of the tools [...]. In the context of 
shared responsibility, however, the participation of 
the parties to the joint determination can take many 
forms and does not necessarily have to be split 
equally’, could the various holders’ ‘care – and answer 
– for the processing of personal data at different 
stages and different degrees’ (as Opinion 1/2010 on 
the concepts of the controller and processor, WP 169, 
adopted 16 February 2010, p. 19, and some 
pronunciations in this context, see Provv. Garante 3 
December 2009, doc. web n. 1692917; Provv. 30 May 
2007, doc. web n. 1412610; Provv. 13 September 
2012, doc. web n. 1927456). 
Granted, in fact, that the biometric authentication 
service, made through the use of ‘integrated’ 
information platforms of individual banks and IT 
Telecom s.r.l., also and especially responds to the 
need – typical both to credit and financial services 
operators, and to the same certification authority – to 
‘identify’ in a rigorous and unambiguous way the 
signatories (the first in respect of the obligations 
imposed by law on money laundering, the second of 
those provided by the regulations on digital signature) 
– it must be pointed out, with regard to the actors 
involved in various capacities in the procedure, that 
the statements made by the parties and the 
documents submitted (whose authenticity can be held 
accountable in criminal proceedings under the 
aforementioned article. 168 of the Code), it appears 
that: 
- Telecom Italy S.p.A.: assumes no actual role in the 
activation and execution of the authentication 
procedure, nor does it deal, in practice, with biometric 
data relating to the parties concerned. This, regardless 
of its reported role of ‘principal contractor’ (see 
footnote IT Telecom 21 December 2012, p. 2), and 
also deduced from the accompanying draft 
‘agreement for the provision of services related to 
underwriting and retention of documents computer’; 
- Banks: 
• determine the purpose of treatment (made known 
to the supplier and formalized through the aforesaid 
draft agreement), requiring specifically, through the 
signing of a special agreement, the use of the overall 
service of the digital signature with biometric 
authentication specifically provided by IT Telecom 
s.r.l.; 
• determine the mode of execution of the treatment, 
limited to the operations of collecting biometric data 
of the interested parties (see note IT Telecom s.r.l. 
dated 21 December 2012, p. 3); 
• claim powers of inspection and verification, 
exercisable at their sole discretion, with regard to the 
‘services’ provided by the certification authority (see 
articles. 5, letter M) n) o) p), and 11 of the draft 
agreement); 
• establish alternative ways of recognizing users in the 
event of failure to adhere to the procedure of 
biometric authentication (see ‘Notes to the 
presentation,’ attached to the note Cariparma S.p.A. 
dated 27 November 2012, p. 6); 
• identify and take any further action with respect to 
its information infrastructure (see footnote IT 
Telecom s.r.l. dated 21 December 2012, p. 4); 
- IT Telecom s.r.l.: 
• determines the purpose of treatment, measuring it 
against the management of the overall digital 
signature service offered to the applicant banks (see 
note IT Telecom dated 21 December 2012, p. 2); 
• determines the mode of execution of the treatment, 
defining the technical and organizational standards of 
the authentication procedure, also abiding by the 
related provisions of the specific sector (including 
Legislative Decree no. 82/2005, regarding the ‘Digital 
Administration Code’); 
• identify the individuals to which possibly give the 
task in relation to the operations of identification and 
registration of data of the signatories, giving them the 
relevant instructions (see also art. 16 of the draft 
contract of 7 November 2012); 
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• applies, on how to deliver the service, any changes 
requested by the technological and regulatory 
evolution (see article. 3, letter. e) of the draft contract 
of 7 November 2012); 
• adopt, as part of the overall service of digital 
signature (to which the processing of biometric data is 
appointed in advance) all necessary measures of its 
organization (also preparing the forms containing the 
terms and conditions of service usage), including 
security measures in accordance with the provisions 
of the Code (see Art. 14 of the draft contract of 7 
November 2012). 
In light of these overall elements, it therefore seems 
difficult, in this case, to recognize two distinct 
treatments of biometric data by the individual banks 
and IT Telecom s.r.l. (which, however, if considered 
individually, would be self-contained), having rather 
to be considered, also with a view to facilitating the 
exercise of the rights under art. 7 of the Code by those 
concerned, that the actors involved, although 
operating ‘in sequence’, are performing different 
operations of a single treatment aiming to provide for 
the authentication of the person concerned, using, for 
this purpose, tools established jointly (and operating 
in an ‘integrated’ manner) and answering, on the 
same treatment, only for their portion of range (in this 
context, see the opinion already mentioned of the 
Article 29 Group, p. 21). 
5.3. With regard to compliance with the principles 
established by the Code, it is pointed out that the 
processing of biometric data that the companies 
intend to carry out, based on the documentation 
provided and the statements made, is lawful. It must 
in fact be noted, in general terms, that the secure and 
rigorous identification of users, already required from 
banks with a view to a sound and prudent risk 
management (see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision), is, often, also an obligation on the part 
of all the lenders to specific sector regulations (see, 
for example, Legislative Decree n. 231/2007, also 
Guarantor’s Opinion of 25 July 2007, web n. 1189435), 
more in general, on the obligations regarding 
customer identification, cf. Provv. 27 October 2005, 
doc. web n. 1189435 and Provv. 25 October 2007, 
bearing the title ‘Guidelines for processing data 
related to the bank-customer relationship’ doc. web 
n. 1457247) the violation of which, however, can be a 
source of civil liability (see Cass. 16 December 2009, n. 
3350), also assessable the same way as art. 1176, 2nd 
paragraph, cc (with possible relevance, therefore, also 
of negligence: in this sense, Trib. Ariano Irpino 2 
October 2008, Cass. 30 January 2006, no. 1865). To 
this, it is to be added that the biometric 
authentication of users with a view to signing digital 
documents could, on the one hand, help to deal 
effectively with the growing number of fraud cases 
declared by the banks and, on the other hand, 
streamline and speed up (and also benefit the user) 
the identification operations at the counter. It should 
then be noted, again, that the treatment in question, 
in so far as actually to be regarded as compatible with 
the current regulatory framework applicable to digital 
signature services provided by IT Telecom s.r.l. (in this 
sense, however, a first opening to the usability of 
biometric techniques, albeit within the wider context 
for the services of ‘electronic signature’, it seems 
apparent already in the ‘Guide to the Digital 
Signature’ prepared by the then CNIPA , version 1.3, 
April 2009, p. 11; in perspective, see the ‘Scheme 
d.P.C.M. under articles 20, paragraph 3, 24, paragraph 
4, 28, paragraph 3, 32, paragraph 3, letter b), 35, 
paragraph 2, 36, paragraph 2, and 71 of d. l.gvo 7 
March 2005, n. 82’, available at www.digitpa.gov.it) 
may be functional, albeit indirectly, to ensure 
compliance in practice with the stringent 
requirements for the recognition of the interested 
parties that the specific sector legislation (Legislative 
Decree n. 82/2005, cit.; d.P.C.M. 30 March 2009) 
imposes on the same certification authorities for the 
purposes of providing the service. Considering, finally, 
that the processing of biometric data of the 
signatories, except as specified in following paragraph 
6, will be based on the informed consent of the 
persons concerned and for the pursuit of legitimate 
goals made known to the latter ones, it must be held 
that, in the light of what is mentioned above, are 
integrated, with respect to this case, the requirements 
of art. 11, paragraph 1, lett. a) and b) of the Code. 
With regard, then, to the observance of the principles 
of necessity and proportionality (articles 3 and11, 
paragraph 1, lett. D) of the Code), it is to be stressed 
that the system described, in the indicated 
configuration mode, allows the treatment of 
biometric data of the interested parties in the form 
‘separated’ from the relevant registry data (stored in a 
special database, however, distinct from the one that 
contains the specimen), so as to enable them to be 
identified only indirectly. In addition, the biometric 
information acquired by the system appear to be only 
those necessary for the creation of the template and 
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to the subsequent comparison during authentication 
of the signing parties. 
Even in terms of the processed data security, it can be 
assumed that the immediate encryption information 
at individual banks and their transmission to IT 
Telecom s.r.l. through the ‘https’ channels is 
considered reliable, as well as the appropriate 
configuration of the firewall access rules provided at 
the data centre of the certification authority (see 
document IT Telecom s.r.l. attached to the notice 
dated 27 April 2012, p. 17) constitute measures 
appropriate under articles 31 and subsequent ones of 
the Code. Given, then, that the companies have also 
declared their intention to adopt organizational 
solutions (physical separation of servers, location of 
the same in premises adequately protected and 
accessible only by authorized personnel; tracking of 
transactions and data access systems, etc.), such that, 
as of today’s knowledge, to lead it to believe the risk 
of any improper operations on the biometric data of 
the interested parties as remote, it can conclusively 
be said that the treatment, as proposed, complies, 
also with regard to the aspects concerning the safety 
measures, to the discipline of the Code. 
So, on the further assumption that the same 
certification authority – already required to operate 
according to the strict standards set by current 
legislation (Legislative Decree no. 82/2005, cit.; 
d.P.C.M. dated 30 March 2009) – is also subject to 
stringent supervision of the Agenzia per l’Italia 
Digitale. 
Finally, by virtue of the provisions of art. 11, 
paragraph 1, lett. c) of the Code, it appears as being in 
line with the provisions of law in force for the 
adoption of mechanisms of self-learning suitable to 
ensure, over time, the ‘quality’ of biometric data 
processed. 
6. Additional requirements. 
As anticipated (see section 2.1), these companies shall 
make the required disclosure available to interested 
parties throughout the process of joining the service. 
However, in the models acquired the characteristics of 
the treatment relative to the biometric data of the 
persons concerned appear as not duly highlighted. 
The companies shall therefore amend and/or 
supplement the information made available to the 
signatories related to this specific treatment, making 
available to them all the elements of art. 13 of the 
Code and focusing in particular on the type of data 
collected and the information that can be derived 
from them, on the profile of co-ownership (article 13, 
paragraph 1, lett. F) of the Code) and the objectives 
pursued separately by each co-owner within the 
biometric authentication procedure (article 13, 
paragraph 1, lett. a) of the Code). 
In addition, subject to any applicable specific 
regulations and the need for further conservation 
resulting from any disputes, also in legal proceedings, 
the biometric data of the interested parties shall be 
retained by the parties for the period of time strictly 
necessary to achieve the purposes for which they 
have been collected and further processed (article 11, 
paragraph 1, lett. e) of the Code) and deleted 
immediately after, or as soon as technically possible 
for this purpose and in any event no later than the 
indicated period of 30 days. 
Finally, the company must take care, before the start 
of treatment, of modifying the existing notification 
made in accordance with articles 37 and following of 
the Code. 
It is understood, of course, that the processing of 
biometric data of the persons concerned can be 
considered legitimate, in this case, only if their 
consent is actually freely acquired in a correct form 
(article 23 of the Code), and cannot be considered as 
such if it is collected as a result of any pressures or 
influences also on the occasion of adhesion to the 
service (in this regard, cf., most recently, Provv. 4 
October 2012, doc. web n. 2059743). In this sense, it 
is crucial that the individual concerned is actually 
provided with the actual freedom of choice as to the 
possibility of using or not using the procedure of 
biometric authentication, as well as the related 
possibility, by each bank, however, to ensure the use 
of the subscription service of digitally signed 
documents through alternative modes of 
authentication. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the guarantor, 
pursuant to art. 17 of the Code, at the conclusion of 
the preliminary verification request by Cassa di 
Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza S.p.A., Banca Popolare 
Friuladria S.p.A., Cassa di Risparmio della Spezia S.p.A. 
and IT Telecom s.r.l., for use within the service 
preordained to subscribe documents with digital 
signature, of a system for the recognition of biometric 
characteristics of the handwritten signature affixed by 
the interested parties on devices dedicated to it, 
admits the processing of biometric data in the terms 
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set out in the narrative and in due respect of what 
stated by the companies that apply pursuant to art. 
168 of the Code, and subject to the companies 
following actions: 
1. Duly amend and/or supplement the information to 
be provided to the parties concerned, indicating in 
detail all the elements of art. 13 of the Code and 
focusing in particular on the profiles related to the 
type of data collected and the information that can be 
derived from them, including joint ownership and the 
purpose of the treatment; 
2. Acquire a truly free consent by the parties 
concerned, in compliance with art. 23 of the Code; 
3. Preserve the biometric data of the interested 
parties, subject to any applicable specific regulations 
and requirements for extended preservation deriving 
from any disputes arising from judicial office, also for 
the time strictly necessary to fulfil the purposes for 
which they were collected and further processed 
(article 11, paragraph 1, lett. e) of the Code), also 
ensuring their immediate deletion, or in the time 
technically required for this purpose and in any event 
no later than the indicated period of 30 days; 
4. Modify, prior to the beginning of the treatment 
itself, the notifications already carried out in 
accordance with articles 37 and following of the Code. 
 
Under articles 152 of the Code and 10 of the 
legislative decree n. 150/2011, the present provision 
may be opposed against at the ordinary courts, by 
application lodged at the ordinary court of the place 
of residence of the owner of the data treatment, 
within the period of thirty days from the date of 
communication of the measure or sixty days if the 
applicant resides abroad. 
Rome, 31 January 2013 
THE PRESIDENT 
Soro 
THE REPORTER 
Soro 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
Busia 
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